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INTRODUCTION 
 After finally deciding to take a long needed vacation, instead of booking a hotel for your 
stay, you decide to utilize the sharing economy to both save money and stay in a more residential 
environment.
1
 You book your stay through Airbnb because this service allows you to reserve an 
entire house for a week for the same or even less than the cost of a hotel.
2
 Once your vacation 
comes around, you travel to your Airbnb rental; however, upon arrival, you know that something 
is not right because no one is home to give you the keys to your hotel alternative. Luckily, you 
are able to contact Airbnb’s 24/7 help service, and they assist you in finding another rental in the 
area.
3
 Despite the rocky start, your vacation continues and you eventually go home, happy that 
you chose to book an alternative accommodation.
4
 
 But what happened to your original host? Turns out, the host was renting his home in 
violation of local housing regulations because he needed the income to continue paying his rent.
5
 
When his landlord found out, eviction proceedings began and the host was evicted prior to your 
stay.
6
 Airbnb did not assist the host because it disclaims liability when hosts fail to abide by state 
and local housing regulations.
7
 So while Airbnb assisted you in finding a new Airbnb rental, the 
alternative accommodations company did not assist your original host in navigating through the 
regulations governing whether he could be an Airbnb host.  
                                                     
 
1
 Georgios Zervas, David Proserpio & John W. Byers, The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of 
Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 30 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, Jan. 27, 2016) (“The 
sharing economy has recently emerged as a viable alternative to fulfilling a variety of consumer needs, ranging from 
prepared meals to cars to overnight accommodations, that were previously provided primarily by firms rather than 
entrepreneurial individuals.”). 
2
 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
3
 Trust & Safety, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/trust (last visited May 7, 2016). 
4
 This hypothetical scenario is based in part on Horror Stories, SHARE BETTER, http://www.sharebetter.org/airbnb-
horror-stories/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
5
 Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 107 (2015); see infra Subsection II.C.1. 
6
 See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
7
 Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms (last visited May 7, 2016). 
 
 
2 
Airbnb disclaims itself from an obligation to protect hosts from local regulations, as well 
as their lease agreements.
8
 Further, when hosts face fines and possible eviction as a result of 
violating these regulations, Airbnb avoids liability not only because of its disclaimer but also 
because of the protection granted to it by the Communications Decency Act.
9
 Therefore, Airbnb 
hosts are left to navigate local regulations on their own, a situation that can result in 
unanticipated legal repercussions.
10
 To prevent hosts from violating state and local housing 
regulations, Airbnb should take social responsibility for monitoring the legality of its rental 
units.
11
 
This Note explores the effects of Airbnb’s disclaimer of liability for hosts’ violations of 
state and local housing regulations and presents different methods of promoting platform-level 
liability for illegal Airbnb rentals. Ultimately, this Note suggests that self-accountability sparked 
by social pressure is the best method to promote the alternative accommodations platform to 
monitor hosts’ compliance with local regulations. This Note begins with a brief introduction to 
the sharing economy in Part I. Part I also introduces alternative accommodations companies and 
Airbnb. Part II presents § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects Airbnb from 
liability for the actions of its users. Also discussed in Part II are state regulations and their effects 
on Airbnb hosts. Part III of this Note outlines three alternatives to shift liability for the legality of 
rental units from hosts to Airbnb and suggests that an approach based on social responsibility 
and societal pressure is best. 
                                                     
 
8
 Id. 
9
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see also infra Sections II.A-B. 
10
 See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
11
 See infra Section III.B. 
 
 
3 
I. THE SHARING ECONOMY 
 The underlying principles of the sharing economy are thought to guide the operations of 
sharing economy companies. The following sections outline the principles and characteristics of 
the sharing economy.
12
 Further, the following sections describe the practices of alternative 
accommodations companies within the sharing economy.
13
 Lastly, Airbnb is profiled.
14
 
A. Principles and Characteristics of the Sharing Economy 
 The environment, or community, in which Airbnb and other alternative accommodations 
companies operate is called the “sharing economy.” The sharing economy has many names, such 
as “‘the relationship economy,’ the ‘cooperative economy,’ the ‘grassroots economy,’ or just the 
‘new economy.’”15 Operating within the sharing economy is the peer-to-peer economy, of which 
alternative accommodations companies are a part.
16
 The peer-to-peer economy facilitates 
transactions between consumers without the use of a traditional intermediary party.
17
 However, 
no matter what designation is used to refer to the sharing economy, it is defined by key principles. 
 Principles of the sharing economy include shared ownership, cooperation, and using 
assets in ways that are socially or environmentally beneficial.
18
 By following these principles, 
the sharing economy allows individuals to access necessary goods and services without requiring 
the individual to own a good or purchase a service on their own.
19
 As a result, the sharing 
                                                     
 
12
 See infra Section I.A. 
13
 See infra Section I.B. 
14
 See infra Section I.C. 
15
 JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 1 (2012). 
16
 ORSI, supra note 15, at 5. 
17
 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Economy, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/peertopeer-p2p-economy.asp 
(last visited May 7, 2016). 
18
 ORSI, supra note 15, at 2, 5. 
19
 Id. at 2, 4; Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 
BOS. B.J. 6, 6 (2014). 
 
 
4 
economy is not solely concerned with sharing. Rather, the sharing economy strives to create a 
socio-economic environment focused on using labor and resources to their maximum potential.
20
 
To facilitate a socio-economic environment focused on sharing goods and services, 
members of the sharing economy create sharing agreements when conducting transactions.
21
 
Many laws, however, did not contemplate the development of sharing agreements.
22
 Thus, rather 
than relying on traditional laws to validate sharing agreements, sharing economy companies rely 
on “reputation systems and monitoring tools” to facilitate successful peer-to-peer transactions.23 
Consequently, sharing economy transactions have exposed many gray areas in the law.
24
  
Gray areas in the law that the sharing economy reveal result from the fact that the current 
legal system assumes that individuals enter transactions due to three mutually exclusive 
motivations: personal, commercial, and charitable.
25
 Transactions in the sharing economy, 
however, straddle and blur the lines between these three categories.
26
 At least one scholar views 
these legal gray areas as indications that change in the law is required.
27
 Despite gray areas in the 
                                                     
 
20
 Brhmie Balaram, How to Defeat Monopoly Power in the Sharing Economy, SHAREABLE (Feb. 7, 2016), 
http://www.shareable.net/blog/how-to-defeat-monopoly-power-in-the-sharing-economy. 
21
 ORSI, supra note 15, at 5. 
22
 Id. at 13 (“Many of our laws developed over the last century to manage economic relationships that were 
becoming increasingly polarized or exploitative.”). Examples of laws that did not foresee sharing relationships 
include employer–employee and landlord–tenant laws. “Although the legal gray areas encountered by the sharing 
economy can be bewildering, the very fact that activities in the sharing economy cannot be put into traditional legal 
boxes tells us something very powerful and hopeful: these activities are radically different from what we have been 
doing for the past century. . . . By eluding most traditional legal categories, the sharing economy has shown us that it 
is, truly, a new economy.” Id. 
23
 Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 
1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-
sharing-economy/. 
24
 ORSI, supra note 15, at 13. 
25
 Id. at 14. 
26
 Id.; Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 19, at 6. Sharing economy companies are disruptive innovations, which 
further challenges the current legal environment. See Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature 
Disruption of Legal Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1809-15. 
27
 ORSI, supra note 15, at 16 (“Certain employment laws, securities regulations, commercial regulations, and zoning 
ordinances create incredibly difficult legal barriers, such that we should change them sooner rather than later.”). 
 
 
5 
law, many sharing economy companies have emerged, and these companies rely on trust and 
reputation to be successful.
28
 
B. Sharing Economy Companies 
Sharing economy transactions are typically mediated by companies operating as Internet 
platforms. Platforms are entities that facilitate exchange between producers and consumers.
29
 
The main difference between platforms and traditional producers is that platforms typically do 
not own their inventory.
30
 Internet platforms operating in the sharing economy are numerous and 
span various service sectors. For example, Uber
31
 and Lyft
32
 operate in the transportation sector; 
Kickstarter
33
 and Pozible
34
 operate in the crowd funding sector; and Rover
35
 and Dogvacay
36
 
provide pet-sitting services. Alternative accommodations companies facilitate “peer-to-peer 
property rental,” which allows individuals to rent rooms in their home or rent their entire house 
for short periods.
37
 Each operating sector within the sharing economy faces unique challenges 
with reference to the law;
38
 however, this Note focuses on the alternative accommodations sector 
of the sharing economy, specifically Airbnb.
39
 
 There are many alternative accommodations companies operating in the sharing economy. 
For example, HomeAway, Inc. operates three alternative accommodations companies in the 
                                                     
 
28
 See Sundararajan, supra note 23; see also, e.g., Trust & Safety, supra note 3. 
29
 Sangeet Choudary, How the Hotel Industry Got Blindsided . . . And Why Yours Could Be Next, FORBES (July 7, 
2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/07/07/how-the-hotel-industry-got-blindsided-and-
why-yours-could-be-next/#70403ae1557f. 
30
 Id. 
31
 UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
32
 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
33
 KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
34
 POZIBLE, http://www.pozible.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
35
 ROVER, https://www.rover.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
36
 DOGVACAY, https://dogvacay.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
37
 Peer-to-Peer Property Rental, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer_property_rental (last 
modified Nov. 3, 2015, 7:27 PM). 
38
 See, e.g., Alexi Pfeffer-Gillet, When “Disruption” Collides with Accountability: Holding Ridesharing Companies 
Liable for Acts of Their Drivers, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 223 (2016). 
39
 See infra Section I.C. 
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United States as well as companies scattered throughout the world.
40
 Like other alternative 
accommodations companies, HomeAway facilitates rental contracts between hosts and guests,
41
 
and the company is not a party to these contracts.
42
 Another alternative accommodations 
company operating within the sharing economy is Onefinestay, which operates in 130 
countries.
43
 Onefinestay operates more like a hotel than other companies. For example, 
Onefinestay’s services include the use of local teams to clean the rentals and to greet guests upon 
arrival.
44
 Other alternative accommodations include FlipKey, which is operated by 
TripAdvisor,
45
 and Couchsurfing.
46
 The most notable alternative accommodations company—
and, for that reason, the focus of this Note—is Airbnb.47 
C. Airbnb 
Airbnb advertises itself as “a trusted community marketplace for people to list, discover, 
and book unique accommodations around the world.”48 Further, Airbnb operates in a way that 
allows users to benefit from the use of extra space in their residence.
49
 To facilitate the trust it 
boasts, Airbnb has adopted a number of policies and a peer-review system that form the basis of 
                                                     
 
40
 Company Information, HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway.com/info/about-us/company-info (last visited May 7, 
2016). HomeAway, Inc. operates “HomeAway.com, VRBO.com and VacationRentals.com in the United States; 
HomeAway.co.uk and OwnersDirect.co.uk in the United Kingdom; HomeAway.de in Germany; Abritel.fr and 
Homelidays.com in France; HomeAway.es and Toprural.es in Spain; AlugueTemporada.com.br in Brazil; 
HomeAway.com.au and Stayz.com.au in Australia; and Bookabach.co.nz in New Zealand. Asia Pacific short-term 
rental site, travelmob.com, is also owned by HomeAway.” Id. 
41
 How It Works. Explore. Book. Travel, HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway.com/info/homeaway/owner-
marketing/how-it-works?icid=IL_support_BR_T_Text_howitworks_LOTH_howitworks (last visited May 7, 2016). 
42
 Terms and Conditions, HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway.com/info/about-us/legal/terms-conditions (last 
updated Sept. 15, 2015). 
43
 ONEFINESTAY, http://www.onefinestay.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
44
 Our Service, ONEFINESTAY, http://www.onefinestay.com/service/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
45
 FLIPKEY, https://www.flipkey.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
46
 COUCHSURFING, https://www.couchsurfing.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
47
 AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016); Andrew Couts, Terms & Conditions: Airbnb Makes 
Everything Your Problem, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/terms-conditions-
airbnb/ (noting that Airbnb has become increasingly controversial). 
48
 About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited May 7, 2016). 
49
 See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
 
 
7 
Airbnb’s sharing agreements.50 These policies however, have drawn negative attention from 
social organizations and government officials.
51
 
1. Airbnb Operations 
Airbnb is an alternative accommodations company that was founded in San Francisco, 
California, in August 2008.
52
 The company, which currently advertises over 2 million listings, 
has facilitated rentals for more than 60 million guests in over 34,000 cities in 190 countries.
53
 
Airbnb boasts that it provides an easy and efficient way for individuals to monetize their space.
54
 
Accordingly, Airbnb provides hosts with a way to make their own housing more affordable.
55
 
Airbnb’s proclaimed ease of use extends to the process of becoming an Airbnb host. To 
become an Airbnb host, first, a prospective host provides their home type, room type, the number 
of people the rental will accommodate, and the city.
56
 Next, the individual provides personal 
information, which includes name, email, and birthday.
57
 Finally, the prospective host clicks the 
“Sign up” button, which also signifies “agree[ment] to Airbnb’s Terms of Service, Privacy 
Policy, Guest Refund Policy, and Host Guarantee Terms.”58 In these simple steps an individual 
becomes signed up to be an Airbnb host; however, listing the first rental requires an additional 
seven steps.
59
 These steps include providing basic information about the rental; giving a short 
description of the rental, its location, and amenities; uploading at least one photo of the listing; 
                                                     
 
50
 See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
51
 See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
52
 About Us, supra note 48. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 5, at 107. 
56
 List Your Space, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/rooms/new (last visited May 7, 2016). 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 The listing information is connected with an individual account, which requires a password. Therefore a citation 
would be ineffective. 
 
 
8 
completing a home safety checklist, including emergency instructions to leave at the rental; and 
providing pricing and availability information.
60
 
Airbnb facilitates rentals of two main types of units. The first type of Airbnb unit is the 
“host-present” rental, which typically involves a host renting out a private room within their 
residence.
61
 The second type of Airbnb unit is the “host-absent” rental.62 A host-absent rental 
occurs when an Airbnb host rents out their entire residence.
63
 Although host-absent rentals are 
often the subject of Airbnb horror stories,
64
 both host-absent and host-present Airbnb units result 
in unanticipated issues for hosts.
65
 
2. How Airbnb Gains Users’ Trust 
To combat any uneasiness that hosts or guests may have, Airbnb strives to establish a 
relationship of trust between hosts, guests, and itself. Some ways in which Airbnb attempts to 
establish mutual trust is through an identification verification system,
66
 two-way review system, 
and a 24/7 help center.
67
 Airbnb has also adopted a Guest Refund Policy, which allows guests to 
receive a refund if a “Travel Issue” occurs,68 and a $1 million Host Guarantee, which acts as 
                                                     
 
60
 See supra note 59. 
61
 THE AIRBNB ANALYST, http://the-airbnb-analyst.com/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id.; see, e.g., Horror Stories, supra note 4. 
65
 Airbnb “Entire Place” Rentals Are the Source of Most Airbnb Horror Stories, THE AIRBNB ANALYST, http://the-
airbnb-analyst.com/airbnb-entire-place-rentals-source-horror-stories/ (last visited May 7, 2016); see infra Subsection 
II.C.1. 
66
 The only identification Airbnb requires for verification is the Airbnb user’s email address. The Airbnb user may 
choose to provide more information. 
67
 Trust & Safety, supra note 3; see also Help Center, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help (last visited May 7, 
2016). 
68
 Guest Refund Policy Terms, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms/guest_refund_policy (last visited May 7, 
2016). Travel Issues outlined in the Guest Refund Policy include instances in which the host cancels a reservation or 
does not provide the guest with access to the reservation or the accommodation does not match its description. Id. 
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insurance for specific types of property damage to rentals.
69
 Further, in an attempt to increase the 
safety of Airbnb rentals, the company posts hosting etiquette and rental safety tips for its hosts.
70
  
Although Airbnb’s attempts to develop trust between hosts, guests, and itself, Airbnb 
disclaims itself from liability for the actions of its hosts.
71
 One instance of this disclaimer appears 
as a footnote on Airbnb’s “Responsible Hosting” webpage, and it states, “Please note that Airbnb 
has no control over the conduct of Hosts and disclaims all liability. Failure of Hosts to satisfy 
their responsibilities may result in suspension of activity or removal from the Airbnb website.”72 
Another, instance of Airbnb’s disclaimer of responsibility for hosts appears in the Terms of 
Service, to which hosts agree when they complete the process of becoming a host.
73
 Airbnb’s 
Terms of Service state the following: 
In particular, Hosts should understand how the laws work in their respective cities. Some cities have 
laws that restrict their ability to host paying guests for short periods. These laws are often part of a city’s 
zoning or administrative codes. In many cities, hosts must register, get a permit, or obtain a license before 
listing a property or accepting guests. Certain types of short-term bookings may be prohibited altogether. 
Local governments vary greatly in how they enforce these laws. Penalties may include fines or other 
enforcement. Hosts should review local laws before listing a space on Airbnb.
74
 
In an effort to prompt hosts to learn local regulations, Airbnb posts a list of housing regulations 
and zoning ordinances for forty-eight cities within the United States on a separate page of its 
website.
75
 
                                                     
 
69
 The $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee (last visited May 7, 2016). The 
guarantee does not cover “cash and securities, pets, personal liability, [and] shared or common areas.” Id. 
70
 Responsible Hosting, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/responsible-hosting (last visited May 7, 2016); Home 
Safety, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/home-safety (last visited May 7, 2016). 
71
 Responsible Hosting, supra note 70. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Terms of Service, supra note 7; List Your Space, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/rooms/new (last visited May 7, 
2016). 
74
 Terms of Service, supra note 7. Recently, Airbnb has added an additional item to its Terms of Service, which 
designates Airbnb hosts as independent, third party contractors. Id. Whether Airbnb hosts truly are independent 
contractors is not analyzed in this Note as it is not critical to the discussion. 
75
 Responsible Hosting, supra note 70. 
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 As a result of Airbnb’s efforts to remove itself from liability for the actions of its hosts, 
opposition to Airbnb has become common.
76
 For example, Share Better is an association whose 
mission is to expose the negative effects of Airbnb on society.
77
 Elected officials and other 
organizations support Share Better.
78
 Further some government officials have also lobbied to 
increase regulations on Airbnb. An example of lobbying against Airbnb’s disclaimer of liability 
is the failed California Senate Bill 593, which proposed that Airbnb, as an Internet platform, 
should bear the burden of ensuring that its listings comply with state and local housing 
regulations.
79
 
 Despite some opposition to Airbnb’s practices, the Internet platform continued to 
distance itself from liability for the legality of its listings. As Part II will illustrate, Airbnb is able 
to avoid liability for hosts’ violations of state and local regulations as a result of § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act and courts’ interpretations of the statute.80 As a result, states’ 
attempts to place more liability on the Internet platform have not yet been successful.
81
 
II. REGULATION OF AIRBNB 
 Companies operating within the sharing economy generally task users with navigating 
the laws that govern the transactions into which they enter.
82
 Airbnb hosts are included within 
the population of users who must determine for themselves the risk of operating within the 
                                                     
 
76
 Couts, supra note 47 (“Airbnb has become increasingly controversial over the past couple years due to the fact 
that home or apartment renters are probably violating the terms of their lease by effectively ‘rerenting’ out their 
space on Airbnb—technically known as subletting. If you choose to ignore the terms of your lease, that’s your 
problem—Airbnb absolves itself of all responsibility. Just don’t be surprised if your landlord serves you with an 
eviction notice.”). 
77
 SHARE BETTER, http://www.sharebetter.org/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
78
 Id. 
79
 See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
80
 See infra Sections II.A-B. 
81
 See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
82
 Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models Well-Adapted to 
Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 53 (2015). 
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sharing economy.
83
 The main reasons Airbnb can charge hosts with this task are its Terms of 
Service
84
 and § 230 of the Federal Communications Decency Act, which is interpreted to grant 
Internet platforms protection from liability for the actions of their users.
85
 As a result, Airbnb 
hosts become the targets of local regulations, which may result in fines, legal action, and 
eviction.
86
 Further, states have been unsuccessful in their attempts to increase Airbnb’s liability 
for the legality of its rentals.
87
 
A. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
Section 230 of the Federal Communications Decency Act protects Airbnb and other 
Internet platforms operating in the sharing economy from liability for users’ actions.88 Congress 
enacted the statute in response to a case in which a New York state court held a company liable 
as a publisher for the content of all posts to its message board because the company previously 
deleted defamatory posts from the message board.
89
 The intention behind the statute was to 
motivate Internet platforms to establish “proactive screening measures”90  by eliminating the 
negative risks of monitoring.
91
 Since its enactment in 1996, the text of § 230 has not changed, 
despite the constant evolution of the Internet.
92
 
                                                     
 
83
 Terms of Service, supra note 7. 
84
 See id. 
85
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). The Communications Decency Act is the common designation for Title V of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
86
 See infra Section II.C. 
87
 See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
88
 § 230. 
89
 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
90
 Stephen Collins, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet: The Case for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1499 (2008); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that Congress’s intent was to promote self-regulation of service providers). 
91
 Matthew Feuerman, Court-Side Seats? The Communications Decency Act and the Potential Threat to Stubhub 
and Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces, 57 B.C. L. REV. 227, at 233 (2016); Ryan Gerdes, Scaling Back S 230 Immunity: 
Why the Communications Decency Act Should Take a Page from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Service 
Provider Immunity Playbook, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 653, 675 (2012). 
92
 Brittany McNamara, Note, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 149, 161 (2015). Compare 
§ 230(c)(1), with Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137 (May 7, 1996). 
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The pertinent language of § 230 that protects Internet platforms from liability for actions 
of their users states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”93 Section 230 does not prevent states from enforcing laws consistent with it; however, 
Section 230 disallows causes of action that would impose liability under state or local laws that 
are inconsistent with § 230.
94
 This means that an Internet platform is immune from liability for 
the actions and posts of its users as long as the platform is not found to be an information content 
provider for that action or post.
95
 
 To determine whether an Internet platform is liable for the actions of its users, a court 
must determine whether the platform, an interactive computer service provider, is also an 
information content provider.
96
 Information content providers are “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”97 Section 230, however, does not explain 
                                                     
 
93
 § 230(c)(1). Section 230 defines interactive computer service as “any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions.” Id. § 230(f)(2). The term information in the statute is interpreted broadly:  
Congress could have written something like: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any sexually oriented material provided by another information 
content provider.” That is not, however, what it enacted. Where the phrase “sexually oriented material” 
appears in our rephrasing, the actual statute has the word “information.” That covers ads for housing, 
auctions of paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis, biting comments about steroids in baseball, 
efforts to verify the truth of politicians’ promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a web 
site; “information” is the stock in trade of online service providers. 
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 
2008), as amended (May 2, 2008). 
94
 § 230(e)(3). 
95
 Id. § 230(c)(1). 
96
 Id. § 230. 
97
 Id. § 230(f)(3). 
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what “treated as the publisher or speaker” means, which prompts courts to determine the 
meaning of the statute.
98
 
B. Interpreting and Applying § 230  
Courts have interpreted § 230 to immunize interactive computer services from liability 
for maintaining editorial control over users’ posts.99  As the following sections illustrate, an 
interactive computer service provider loses its § 230 protection only if it materially contributes to 
illegal information on its website.
100
 Moreover, § 230 will more than likely bar claims against 
interactive computer service providers based on “passive acquiescence” in users’ illegal 
activity.
101
 
1. Notice Is Not Enough 
In 1997, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., Zeran brought suit against America Online 
after America Online did not remove harmful bulletin board postings upon receiving notice of 
the postings.
102
 Zaren argued that America Online failed to remove the posts in an adequate time 
frame and failed to monitor for similarly harmful posts after receiving the initial notice.
103
 The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment in favor of America Online based 
on the fact that § 230 immunized the interactive computer service provider from Zaren’s 
claims.
104
 
                                                     
 
98
 Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 390-91 (2012); see, e.g., Craigslist, 519 F.3d 
at 670 (discussing possible interpretations of § 230). 
99
 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting § 230 
to mean that interactive service providers are immune if they delete users’ information, but not if they create it). 
100
 Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1167-68). 
101
 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 n.24. 
102
 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997). An unidentified user created the posts on AOL’s 
bulletin board, and the postings linked Zaren to paraphernalia boasting offensive sayings about the Oklahoma City 
bombing. Id. 
103
 Id. at 328. 
104
 Id. at 329. 
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Prior to reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that interactive 
computer services are liable under § 230 based on notice.
105
 In its reasoning, the court noted that 
notice-based liability would disincentivize monitoring because, if service providers learn of 
illegal postings, the likelihood of a court finding them liable under § 230 would increase.
106
 The 
court also noted that notice-based liability would present providers with the impossible task of 
screening millions of postings.
107
 Lastly, the court hypothesized that notice-based liability would 
decrease interactive computer services’ self-regulation.108 The Fourth Circuit’s holding has been 
widely followed, with only a few exceptions.
109
 
2. The Platform Must at Least Be Partially Responsible for the Illegality 
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando v. Roommates.com, the Housing Council 
brought suit against Roommates.com—a website that matches individuals with open rooms with 
individuals looking for a place to stay—for alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act and state 
housing discrimination laws.
110
 The Housing Council alleged that Roommates.com’s website 
required users to answer questions about gender, sexual orientation, and children, and claimed 
that the website acted as a “housing broker doing online what it may not lawfully do off-line.”111 
With regard to the Housing Council’s claims, the Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com 
was not immune from liability under § 230 because the website prompted users to express illegal 
                                                     
 
105
 Id. at 333. 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. at 332 (“It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible 
problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service 
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. Congress considered the weight 
of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”). 
108
 Id. at 333. 
109
 Collins, supra note 90, at 1483 n.99. 
110
 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2008). 
111
 Id. at 1161-62. 
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preferences.
112
 The court reasoned that Roommates.com was at least partially responsible for 
discriminatory information appearing in users’ profiles because both Roommates.com and the 
user played a role in constructing the profiles
113
 Therefore, the court concluded that 
Roommates.com acted as more than “a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper 
purposes,” which removed the interactive computer service from the scope of § 230’s 
immunity.
114
 
3. Screening Is a Burden on Internet Platforms 
In the case of Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, 
the Lawyers’ Committee claimed that Craigslist violated the Fair Housing Act when it published 
discriminatory housing posts on its website.
115
 Interpreting § 230, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision to grant judgment in favor of Craigslist.116 
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning both mentioned the difficulty of monitoring as well as 
critiqued § 230’s effect on interactive computer services. The court noted that under § 230, 
“screening, though lawful, is hard.”117 Further, the court described the difficulty that Craigslist 
would face if it were to implement a screening process, stating: 
An online service could hire a staff to vet the postings, but that would be expensive and may well be 
futile: if postings had to be reviewed before being put online, long delay could make the service much less 
useful, and if the vetting came only after the material was online the buyers and sellers might already have 
made their deals. Every month more than 30 million notices are posted to the craigslist system. Fewer than 
30 people, all based in California, operate the system, which offers classifieds and forums for 450 cities. It 
                                                     
 
112
 Id. at 1165 (“The CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties to express illegal preferences.”). 
113
 Id. at 1167. “By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and by 
providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of 
information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that information.” Id. at 1166. 
114
 Id. at 1172 (“Roommate both elicits the allegedly illegal content and makes aggressive use of it in conducting its 
business . . . Roommate’s work in developing the discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers and 
discriminatory search mechanism is directly related to the alleged illegality of the site.”). 
115
 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
116
 Id. at 672 (“[G]iven § 230(c)(1) [the Lawyers’ Committee] cannot sue the messenger just because the message 
reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”). 
117
 Id. at 668. 
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would be necessary to increase that staff (and the expense that users must bear) substantially to conduct the 
sort of editorial review that the Lawyers’ Committee demands—and even then errors would be frequent.118 
However, the court went on to state that § 230 did not intend for interactive computer services to 
“take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity” from liability for all information published on 
their website.
119
 
 In addition to the outlined cases, courts have held that interactive computer service 
providers are protected from liability under § 230 for actions of their users ranging from housing 
violations
120
 to defamation
121
 to sexual acts with minors.
122
 Courts’ interpretations and 
applications of § 230 have allowed interactive computer service providers, such as Internet 
platforms in the sharing economy, to operate with some certainty that a court will not hold them 
liable for the actions of users.
123
 However, § 230 does not protect Internet platforms’ users from 
liability, which leaves users at risk of violating state and local regulations.
124
 
C. State Regulation 
 Due to § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Airbnb, as an Internet platform, is 
generally not liable for actions of its users.
125
 Therefore, state and local governments are not able 
to directly regulate Airbnb rentals’ violations at the platform level.126 This leads state and local 
agencies to hold Airbnb users, specifically hosts, liable for illegal activity.
127
 The state and local 
                                                     
 
118
 Id. at 668-69. 
119
 Id. at 670 (“§ 230(c)—which is, recall, part of the ‘Communications Decency Act’—bears the title ‘Protection for 
“Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material’, hardly an apt description if its principal effect is to 
induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their services.”). 
120
 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
121
 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997). 
122
 See, e.g., Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319. In Saponaro, the court held Grindr immune from liability 
for Sapornaro’s claims that Grindr negligently failed to enforce the age-restriction in its Terms of Service because 
Grindr merely provides its users with tools that may be used to conduct unlawful conduct. Id. at 322, 324. 
123
 McNamara, supra note 92, at 149. 
124
 Id. 
125
 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); see also supra Section II.A. 
126
 McNamara, supra note 92, at 161. 
127
 Id. 
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regulations affecting Airbnb hosts vary widely. Regulations may enforce a maximum number of 
nights for rentals, require a host to register him or herself as a host or obtain a rental permit or 
license,
128
 or they may be prohibitively burdensome on hosts.
129
 In addition to state laws, Airbnb 
hosts may be subject to homeowners association and deed restrictions, as well as the terms of 
their lease.
130
 
Airbnb encourages its hosts to educate themselves about the zoning and administrative 
codes in their city prior to listing their space,
131
 and the company disclaims liability for hosts’ 
violations of state and local regulations.
132
 Accordingly, Airbnb hosts must locate, comprehend, 
and abide by state and local regulations.
133
 Not surprisingly, Airbnb hosts have encountered 
unanticipated fines, evictions, and legal action due to the varying restrictions on Airbnb 
rentals.
134
 
 State regulations affecting Airbnb hosts range from strict to more lenient. New York and 
California have both attempted to regulate Airbnb, with differing results. New York adheres to a 
strict policy that has resulted in the development of a wealth of case law involving Airbnb 
hosts.
135
 Contrastingly, California has attempted to develop regulations that embrace alternative 
accommodations in the sharing economy.
136
 
                                                     
 
128
 E.g., S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g) (2015). 
129
 E.g., SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 6.20.020 (2015). 
130
 E.g., Gold Street Properties v. Freeman, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 2014 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. June 16, 2014) (lease provision); 
In re David Fruchter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 133 A.D.3d 1174 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (zoning restriction). 
131
 What Legal and Regulatory Issues Should I Consider Before Hosting on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/376/what-legal-and-regulatory-issues-should-i-consider-before-hosting-on-
airbnb (last visited May 7, 2016). 
132
 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
133
 Terms of Service, supra note 7.  
134
 See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
135
 See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
136
 See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
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1. New York 
 In the state of New York, the Multiple Dwelling Law prohibits occupants from renting 
their residence for fewer than thirty consecutive days.
137
 The Multiple Dwelling Law applies this 
restriction to “class A” multiple dwellings, which are “rented, leased, let or hired out, to be 
occupied . . . as the residence or home of three or more families living independently of each 
other . . . [and] is occupied for permanent residence purposes.”138 The law goes on to explicitly 
prohibit individuals who are considered “house guests or lawful boarders, roomers or lodgers” 
from occupying a class A multiple dwelling for fewer than thirty consecutive days.
139
 
 The New York Senate recently introduced a bill that would make the tenant of a class A 
multiple dwelling directly responsible for any violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law.
140
 The 
bill targets short-term rental units that are facilitated through “Internet based residential websites,” 
such as Airbnb.
141
 Further, the bill proposes that owners and landlords of class A multiple 
dwellings are not liable for violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law, unless they have continued 
to allow the occupant to operate a short-term rental unit after acquiring knowledge of the 
violation.
142
 New York’s laws have resulted in a growing area of case law involving alternative 
accommodations hosts. 
a. Non-Rent-Regulated Class A Multiple Dwellings 
In Gold Street Properties v. Freeman, a property management company of an apartment 
that is not subject to rent regulations sought to evict the tenant for operating an Airbnb unit in her 
                                                     
 
137
 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. § 4.7-.8 (McKinney 2011). 
138
 Id. (“For the purposes of this definition, ‘permanent residence purposes’ shall consist of occupancy of a dwelling 
unit by the same natural person or family for thirty consecutive days or more and a person or family so occupying a 
dwelling unit shall be referred to herein as the permanent occupants of such dwelling unit.”). 
139
 Id. § 4.8(1)(A). 
140
 S.B. 7053, 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2016). 
141
 Id. 
142
 Id. 
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residence.
143
 The lease agreement between the tenant and the management company specifically 
prohibited subleasing without consent and commercial activities.
144
 The court, however, held that 
the management company was not entitled to regain possession of the residence because the 
tenant could cure the default.
145
 Accordingly, the rental income the tenant received from acting 
as an Airbnb host did not result in eviction, but it did generate legal action. 
b. Rent-Regulated Class A Multiple Dwellings 
Residences in New York may also be subject to the Rent Stabilization Code in addition to 
the Multiple Dwelling Law. The Rent Stabilization Code prohibits individuals from receiving 
rent for accommodations in an amount that is greater than the legal regulated rent, “or otherwise 
to do or omit to do any act, in violation of any . . . requirement” of the Rent Stabilization 
Code.
146
 Under the rent stabilization law, tenants may sublease their residence so long as the 
tenant does not charge rent in excess of the legal regulated rent.
147
 As demonstrated in Brookford, 
LLC v. Penraat,
148
 if a tenant violates this provision, the landlord may terminate the tenancy 
without providing the tenant an opportunity to cure the violation.
149
 
In Brookford, LLC v. Penraat, the tenant of a rent-controlled, class A multiple dwelling 
used Airbnb to host 135 guests for periods ranging from three to twenty-one nights.
150
 The 
landlord of the dwelling issued the tenant a Notice of Termination of her tenancy for the tenant’s 
                                                     
 
143
 N.Y. L.J., July 2, 2014, at 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. June 16, 2014). 
144
 Id. at 2. 
145
 Id. at 5-6. 
146
 N.Y. RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 2525.1 (McKinney Unconsol. 2015). 
147
 Id. § 2525.6(a)-(b). 
148
 8 N.Y.S.3d 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); see also 335-7 LLC v. Steele, 993 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Table) (N.Y. App. Term 
2014) (holding that the landlord was not required to serve a notice to cure when the tenant violated the Rent 
Stabilization Code while acting as an Airbnb host); 51 W. 86th St. Assoc. LLC v. Fontana, 960 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. 
App. Term 2010); 220 W. 93rd St., LLC v. Stavrolakes, 823 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
149
 N.Y. RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 2524.3(h). 
150
 Brookford, LLC, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 860. 
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violations of both the Multiple Dwelling Law and the Rent Stabilization Code.
151
 The court held 
that the tenant’s actions were in violation of the law, and the landlord was not required to serve 
the tenant with a notice to cure prior to the notice of termination.
152
 
c. Single-Family Residences 
In re David Fruchter v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Hurley demonstrates the 
difference in treatment between class A multiple dwellings and one-family dwellings in New 
York. In this case, Fruchter used the sharing economy to rent his single-family residence for 
stays ranging from one night to an entire season.
153
 The Zoning Board issued Fruchter with an 
order to cease operating an illegal bed-and-breakfast or hotel without a permit.
154
 The court 
determined that Fruchter’s use of the property was not a violation of the zoning regulations 
because the residence did not have “a common exterior entrance or entrances,” and it was not an 
“‘owner-occupied dwelling’ in which only ‘rooms’ were being rented.”155 Although Fruchter 
avoided liability for hosting alternative accommodations using the sharing economy, he did not 
escape unanticipated legal action. 
2. California 
 In contrast to regulations in New York, regulations in California attempt to regulate 
sharing economy alternative accommodations in a more accepting way. At both the state- and 
city-level, California has attempted to adopt regulations that address the legal implications of 
                                                     
 
151
 Id. at 862. Penraat’s actual rent was $4,477.47; however, as a result of operating Airbnb rentals, Penraat received 
rental income of more than $6,500.00 per month on average. Id. at 867-68. 
152
 Id. at 872-73; see also 42nd & 10th Associates LLC v. Ikezi, 50 Misc. 3d 130(A) (N.Y. App. Term 2015) 
(holding that the landlord was not required to serve a notice to cure when the tenant received income from hosting 
on Airbnb in excess of his monthly rent on his rent stabilized apartment). 
153
 133 A.D.3d 1174, 1174 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
154
 Id. at 1174-75. 
155
 Id. at 1176. 
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Internet platforms and alternative accommodations more clearly.
156
 However, California has not 
yet placed full responsibility for ensuring the legality of alternative accommodations on the 
Internet platform.
157
 
a. City-Specific Regulation 
San Francisco, the birthplace of Airbnb, adopted a provision in its administrative code 
that allows permanent residents to conduct legal short-term rentals of their primary residence, 
with restrictions on the number of days in a year that the residence may be rented.
158
 The San 
Francisco Administrative Code states that a permanent resident may rent their unit as long as the 
permanent resident occupies the unit for at least 275 days out of the year.
159
 Prior to renting their 
unit, a permanent resident must register the unit through San Francisco’s Short-Term Residential 
Rental Registry.
160
 Registered renters must comply with applicable rent control and housing code 
provisions to maintain legal status.
161
 
 The city of San Francisco adopted short-term rental provisions in its administrative code 
to avoid the issue of hosts of alternative accommodations violating local laws.
162
 Landlords, 
however, may still prohibit tenants from operating short-term rentals, despite the provisions of 
the city’s administrative code. 163  Further, the administrative code places responsibility for 
compliance with the law on hosts of alternative accommodations, rather than the platform 
                                                     
 
156
 See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
157
 See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
158
 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g) (2015). “Before the Ordinance, the City’s municipal code had long prohibited the 
rental of residential housing units for less than thirty days.” HomeAway Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 14-cv-
04859-JCS, 2015 WL 367121, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015). 
159
 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(A). 
160
 Id. § 41A.5(g)(1)(E); Office of Short-Term Rental Registry & FAQs, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F. PLAN. DEP’T, 
http://sf-planning.org/office-short-term-rental-registry-faqs#q01 (last visited May 7, 2016). 
161
 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(G)-(H). 
162
 Cannon & Chung, supra note 82, at 50. 
163
 Id. 
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facilitating the transactions.
164
 Nevertheless, scholars gravitate toward San Francisco’s approach 
to regulating alternative accommodations because it provides hosts with flexibility, provides 
municipalities with information that can be used for enforcement purposes, and it may generate 
more short-term renting.
165
 
b. State-Level Regulation 
At the state level, California lawmakers have had varied success passing laws to regulate 
alternative accommodations companies. California lawmakers attempted to address Internet 
platform liability for alternative accommodations through California State Senate Bill 593.
166
 
The bill would prohibit alternative accommodations platforms from allowing rental units to 
operate if the rental violates local laws.
167
 The bill would place the liability for “knowing” 
violations of local laws on the platform.
168
 Additionally, platforms would be required to make 
                                                     
 
164
 Id. 
165
 See, e.g., Greggary E. Lines, Note, Hej, Not Hej Då: Regulating Airbnb in the New Age of Arizona Vacation 
Rentals, 57 ARIZ L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2015); Dana Palombo, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to 
Incorporate Short-Term Residential Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 291 (2015).  
San Francisco’s accepting approach, however, is not the only approach California cities have taken to 
regulate alternative accommodations. For example, a Santa Monica ordinance is described as “one of the most 
restrictive ordinances on home-sharing in the country.” Bill Donovan, Patricia Eberwine & Joe Woodring, Here to 
Stay: Legal Challenges in the Home-Sharing Sector of the Sharing Economy, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/10/13/here-to-stay-legal-challenges-in-the-home-sharing. Under this ordinance, 
a homeowner must stay at the home with the visitor, become licensed, and pay a 14% occupancy tax if the home 
owner wants to rent a room in their home. SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 6.20.020 (2015). 
Additionally, despite little locatable case law about disputes involving short-term rental hosts, in Los 
Angeles a landlord was granted summary judgment against a tenant who acted as an Airbnb host. Chen v. Kraft, 197 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2016). The tenant was operating an Airbnb rental in violation of both 
their agreement with the landlord and the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Id. 
166
 S.B. 2015-593, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). During a committee hearing on California Senate Bill 593, the committee 
noted that “[c]ities impose varying restrictions on short-term rentals, from prohibition to no restriction at all. When a 
city prohibits short-term rentals, it is easy to identify violators on the hosting platform. The most effective way to 
enforce the prohibition would be for the platform to bar the listing.” CAL. S. COMM. ON TRANSP. & HOUS. REP., S. 
2015-593, Reg. Sess. (Apr. 16, 2015). The committee further noted that requiring Internet platforms to identify 
violators can be an effective means of enforcement due to a prior instance of telephone companies successfully 
monitoring moving companies adherence to local regulations. Id. (“There is precedent for using an intermediary to 
enforce the law: The California Public Utilities Commission can require telephone companies to disconnect service 
from moving companies who violate their regulations.”). 
167
 S.B. 2015-593, Reg. Sess., at 1. 
168
 Id. 
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quarterly reports to local entities at the city or county level and remit any applicable occupancy 
tax to the locality.
169
 This bill, however, was not passed into law.
170
 
 Not all of California’s bills concerning alternative accommodations companies have died: 
California Senate Bill 761 successfully passed into law.
171
 The law requires Internet platforms to 
notify hosts about the potential illegality of a listing each time the hosts creates a new rental 
listing.
172
 The platform must require that the host “affirmatively acknowledge he or she has read 
the notice.”173 This law, which places some responsibility on the Internet platform, still requires 
hosts of alternative accommodations to locate, comprehend, and abide by applicable local laws. 
As illustrated in New York, placing the majority of the burden on hosts can result in fines, legal 
action, and evictions for the host, while the platform escapes liability. Thus, to avoid placing the 
entire burden of ensuring rental unit legality on hosts, the platform must take on some 
responsibility. Although promoting platforms to take on this responsibility in light of the current 
laws regulating alternative accommodations will be challenging, there are at least three 
approaches that society and lawmakers could use to generate the desired result.
174
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 Id. 
170
 SB-593 Residential Units for Tourist or Transient Use: Transient Residential Hosting Platforms: History, CAL. 
LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB593 (last visited 
May 7, 2016) (stating that the bill “[d]ied on file”). 
171
 S.B. 2015-761, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
172
 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22592, 22594 (West 2016). The platform is required to post the following notice: 
If you are a tenant who is listing a room, home, condominium, or apartment, please refer to your rental 
contract or lease, or contact your landlord, prior to listing the property to determine whether your lease or 
contract contains restrictions that would limit your ability to list your room, home, condominium, or 
apartment. Listing your room, home, condominium, or apartment may be a violation of your lease or 
contract, and could result in legal action against you by your landlord, including possible eviction. 
Id. § 22592. 
173
 Id. § 22594. 
174
 See infra Part III. 
 
 
24 
III. SHIFTING LIABILITY FOR THE LEGALITY OF AIRBNB RENTALS FROM THE HOST TO THE 
PLATFORM 
 Airbnb has successfully and legally avoided liability for the legality of its rentals and the 
actions of its hosts through § 230 of the Communications Decency Act and through its own 
Terms of Service and disclaimer.
175
 Thus, attempts to increase Airbnb’s liability have, so far, not 
been effective.
176
 The next sections present three possible approaches to shift the liability for the 
legality of Airbnb rentals from hosts to the company.
177
 After presenting the three alternatives, a 
proposed best approach is presented.
178
 
A. Three Possible Approaches 
To motivate Airbnb to take on the responsibility of ensuring that its listings comply with 
state and local housing regulations, Congress could amend § 230.
179
 Another approach to shift 
liability from hosts to Airbnb would be to leave current regulations intact and allow the 
principles of the sharing economy to effectuate change.
180
 A third alternative would be to 
increase the level of social pressure applied to Airbnb until the company adopts additional 
monitoring procedures for its listings.
181
 
1. Amend § 230 
Currently, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides interactive computer 
service providers with protection from liability for the actions and posts of users.
182
 Modifying § 
230 to narrow the range of immunity it provides to service providers could disturb service 
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 See supra Sections II.A-B; supra Section I.C. 
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 See supra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
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 See infra Section III.B. 
179
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 See infra Subsection III.A.3. 
182
 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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providers’ accepted reliance on § 230 immunity that has existed for approximately a decade.183 
However, if Congress were to amend § 230 to remove alternative accommodations platforms’ 
protection from liability for hosts’ violations of state and local regulations, the burden of 
ensuring rental unit legality would shift from hosts to the platform.
184
 
With regard to § 230, a proposed approach to resolve the issue of Airbnb’s immunity 
from liability for illegally operated rentals would be to add an exception for housing violations to 
the statute.
185
 One scholar suggests Congress amend § 230 so that interactive computer service 
providers are no longer immune from liability for discriminatory information related to the sale 
or rental of a residence: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, 
except for notices, statements, or advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of a 
dwelling.”186 The same amendment could also affect Airbnb’s liability with reference to the 
legality of advertised rental units. Because Airbnb and other companies would be liable for the 
information contained in listings on their websites, these companies would no longer be immune 
if a unit violated state or local laws.
187
 As a result, Airbnb would be motivated to develop ways 
to decrease the risk of liability for illegally operated units,
188
 which would decrease the 
frequency of legal action brought against Airbnb hosts.
189
 
                                                     
 
183
 See Zaren v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 230 immunized America Online from 
liability for harmful postings on its website). 
184
 See Collins, supra note 90, at 1495. 
185
 See id. (proposing an amendment to § 230 that would add an exception for discriminatory housing practices); 
Michael Todisco, Essay, Share and Share Alike? Considering Racial Discrimination in the Nascent Room-Sharing 
Economy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 128 (2015). 
186
 See Collins, supra note 90, at 1495. 
187
 See id.; See supra Part II.C (describing various state and local regulations affecting Airbnb rentals). 
188
 See Todisco, supra note 185, at 128. 
189
 See supra Part II. 
 
 
26 
An amendment to § 230 that removes protection for violations of housing laws would 
prompt Airbnb to screen rentals for violations of state and local laws to ensure compliance.
190
 
This practice would be in line with Congress’s motivation behind § 230: to prompt interactive 
content providers to adopt proactive screening methods.
191
 However, Congress intended for § 
230 to grant broad protection to interactive computer service providers,
192
 and § 230 already 
contains exceptions that allow courts to hold providers liable for violations of Federal criminal, 
intellectual property, and communications privacy laws.
193
 Adding an additional exception to § 
230 could not only pave the way for other exceptions, but an exception for housing laws could 
also begin to narrow the statute in a way that moves it outside of the scope of what Congress 
intended. 
Another issue associated with adding an exception to § 230 is the risk that innovation and 
growth of the sharing economy and the Internet could be stifled.
194
 In 2013, the estimated worth 
of the peer-to-peer rental sector of the sharing economy was valued at $13 billion,
195
 and Airbnb 
is currently valued at over $10 billion.
196
 While sharing economy companies are prospering, 
Airbnb hosts benefit from the sharing economy because they are able to make additional income 
through their rentals.
197
 Additionally, consumers who use the sharing economy benefit from the 
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increased opportunity to use products and services without owning them outright.
198
 Therefore, a 
decrease in innovation due to an increase in the risk of liability for sharing economy platforms 
could detrimentally affect the economy and its users. One scholar, however, notes that increasing 
the risk of liability for Internet platforms could actually increase innovation because 
entrepreneurs “may develop technologies that assist other companies in minimizing the risk of 
civil liability.”199 
2. Leave Well Enough Alone 
 A second proposed solution to shift liability from Airbnb hosts to the platform is to leave 
the laws protecting Airbnb unchanged.
200
 This solution would not alter the current regulatory 
regime and, thus, not increase Airbnb’s and other Internet platforms’ liability for users’ actions. 
Due to the protection § 230 grants to interactive computer service providers, this approach would 
continue to leave consumers at the mercy of state and local regulations.
201
 
 Leaving current regulations unchanged would benefit Airbnb in that it would not be 
responsible for whether its rentals abide by state and local housing regulations.
202
 Internet 
platforms’ risk of liability would remain constant, and these companies would not need to take 
on the time and cost of implementing additional mechanisms to monitor users’ activity.203 The 
benefits that this approach provides to interactive computer service providers, however, run 
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against Airbnb’s principles of cultivating relationships of trust,204 as well as Congress’s goal for 
§ 230.
205
 
 As a company operating in the sharing economy, Airbnb relies on trusting relationships 
to further the success of its business.
206
 If Airbnb continues to rely on § 230 to avoid liability 
when its hosts violate state and local housing regulations, its business may be negatively affected. 
Specifically, Airbnb hosts who have failed to locate, comprehend, and abide by state and local 
laws may begin to use Airbnb’s two-way review system as a means to express their 
dissatisfaction with a company that profits while its hosts face fines, legal action, and possible 
eviction.
207
 
 Airbnb’s reliance on § 230 to avoid monitoring the legality of rental units may also run 
against Congress’s intention for § 230. When Congress originally enacted § 230, its intention 
was to remove the disincentives of monitoring to encourage Internet platforms to develop and 
utilize measures to screen users’ activity.208 Nevertheless, courts have not interpreted § 230 in a 
way that encourages Internet platforms to take on knowledge of users’ potentially illegal 
actions.
209
 Further, courts have found that screening can be a burden on Internet platforms.
210
 
Therefore, the current regulatory environment may encourage Airbnb to continue to use § 230 as 
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protection from liability rather than implement screening procedures to assist hosts in navigating 
state and local laws.
211
 
3. Apply Social Pressure 
A third possible approach to shift liability for housing violations from hosts to Airbnb is 
to apply societal pressure.
212
 The sharing economy has exposed gray areas in the law,
213
 and its 
companies are taking advantage of this uncertainty.
214
 Using social responsibility as a basis to 
motivate alternative accommodations companies could be more effective than traditional 
government regulations because sharing economy companies do not fit neatly into preexisting 
categories of regulation, which indicates that an alternative solution may be necessary.
215
 
Increasing public awareness of the fact that sharing economy companies do not share in 
the risk of liability may result in action from both public and private entities. If state or local 
government officials continue to lobby for regulations that place greater liability on the Internet 
platform, the platform will likely get the message whether or not the lobbying is successful. For 
example, in California, Senate Bill 593 was unsuccessful in placing the burden of ensuring rental 
legality on Internet platforms facilitating alternative accommodations transactions.
216
 With the 
threat of heightened risk of liability, Airbnb voiced its opposition to California Senate Bill 593, 
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which the Committee on Transportation and Housing discussed during meetings.
217
 Therefore, 
although the bill was unsuccessful, Airbnb was present and listening.
218
 
In the area of grassroots lobbying, websites have already begun to launch attacks on 
Airbnb. For example, Share Better, an association united in opposition to Airbnb’s presence in 
the sharing economy, claims that “Airbnb enables tenants to break the law and potentially violate 
their leases, . . . and it poses serious public safety concerns for Airbnb guests, hosts and their 
neighbors.”219 In addition to publicizing numerous Airbnb “horror stories,”220 Share Better lists 
the elected officials and organizations that support the cause
221
 and tracks recent media coverage 
of Airbnb.
222
 Through its website Share Better provides the public with information needed to 
understand the role that Airbnb plays in regulating the legality of its rentals.
223
  
Increased publicity of Airbnb’s failure to take measures to decrease its hosts’ housing 
violations could lead to changes in Airbnb’s practices because as an alternative accommodations 
company in the sharing economy, Airbnb relies on its reputation to survive.
224
 If public and 
private entities continue to pressure Airbnb through lobbying and educating the public on the 
effects of its practices, Airbnb may choose to implement measures that will decrease the 
prevalence of housing violations among its hosts, like those occurring in New York.
225
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B. Proposed Approach 
 Out of the three possible approaches to shifting the liability for Airbnb rental unit legality 
from hosts to the platform,
226
 applying societal pressure on Airbnb until it accepts social 
responsibility for monitoring its units for housing violations is the best approach. As a 
corporation, Airbnb has the ability to make decisions based on its impact on society, and without 
being regulated to do so.
227
 In the past, for example, Airbnb instituted its guest refund policy 
after initially failing to react when guests ransacked a host’s rental property.228 Airbnb also 
started offering free smoke and carbon monoxide detectors
229
 after an American woman’s death 
in Taiwan.
230
 And, after initially refusing, Airbnb offered to reimburse a man for his stay and pay 
his medical bills after a dog bit him in an Argentinian Airbnb, due to the New York Times 
inquiring about the incident.
231
 Therefore, it is not unlikely that Airbnb would respond positively 
to increased social pressure from public and private entities to take on the responsibility of 
monitoring the legality of its rental units. 
 Promoting Airbnb to monitor rental unit liability is feasible. As an intermediary Internet 
platform operating in the sharing economy, Airbnb is in a position to monitor the activities of its 
users through its size and capacity as a central location for listings.
232
 This positioning allows 
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Airbnb to internally weed out hosts who are operating in violation of regulations, but only if 
Airbnb adopts screening procedures for its listings.
233
 The additional monitoring, however, will 
likely increase the Internet platform’s expenses, and Airbnb will likely pass this cost on to its 
users.
234
 The question to ask when the price of Airbnb’s services increases is whether its users 
will pay more for additional screening measures to ensure that the units are legal or if the added 
costs will deteriorate the trusting relationships Airbnb strives to develop. The desired effect in 
adopting additional screening methods would be to increase trust between Airbnb and its users. 
Adopting new screening procedures will place an additional burden on Airbnb
235
 because 
the alternative accommodations company would need to hire new staff and the new process may 
delay posting of Airbnb listings.
236
 Airbnb, however, will likely overcome this burden based on 
the fact that other alternative accommodations companies have.
237
 Specifically, Onefinestay, 
which operates in 130 countries, compared to Airbnb’s 190 countries, utilizes localized task 
forces to review and photograph each listing on its site.
238
 Onefinestay also meets guests upon 
arrival to provide them with keys to their alternative accommodation.
239
 If Onefinestay is able to 
use localized task forces to prepare its rentals, Airbnb should be able to remotely research local 
rules and regulations. 
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 In addition to being feasible, the proposed solution would require no change to § 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act. Airbnb would still be liable as an interactive computer 
service provider under the Act, and, through the implementation of enhanced monitoring, 
Airbnb’s risk of being held liable for a host operating in violation of housing regulations would 
increase.
240
 Under § 230, if Airbnb were to become knowledgeable about state and local 
regulations affecting its units, it would have notice of any illegality and it would be at least 
partially responsible if a unit were to violate a regulation.
241
 The proposed solution, however, 
would prompt Airbnb to ensure that its hosts operate legal rentals, which should avoid violations 
of the law and, as a result, avoid Airbnb’s liability under state and local regulations. 
 A foreseeable limitation to the proposed approach is that society should pressure Airbnb 
to monitor listings for violations of state and local housing regulations, rather than of hosts’ 
individual lease provisions. This limitation would decrease the burden placed on the Internet 
platform when it adopts additional monitoring practices because state and local housing 
regulations are more readily available and broadly applicable than individual leases.
242
 Further, 
Airbnb hosts who violate the terms of their lease may face less severe repercussions than those 
who violate state and local laws. For example, in New York, a tenant who violated a provision of 
her lease that prohibited her from offering her apartment as a short-term rental was given the 
opportunity to cure her violation.
243
 Conversely, a New York tenant who violated the state’s Rent 
Stabilization Code was not offered the opportunity to cure the violation before eviction 
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proceedings began.
244
 As a result, monitoring for state and local violations rather than lease 
violations will likely be more important in building trusting relationships between Airbnb and its 
users due to the differential effects of the violations. 
If Airbnb implements monitoring practices to ensure the legality of hosts’ rentals, Airbnb 
hosts whose residences are subject to provisions that prohibit temporary subleasing or 
commercial activity in the residence would no longer be able to host. Consequently, these hosts 
would no longer share in the revenue that Airbnb users receive.
245
 However, these individuals 
would benefit from no longer being allowed to host Airbnb rentals in that they would avoid 
violating applicable state or local housing regulations.
246
 Thus, in correspondence with a 
foundational principle of the sharing economy, the proposed solution would increase the level of 
trust between Airbnb users and the platform because users could rest assured that their rental unit 
is not in violation of the law or that they avoided violating the law as a result of being weeded 
out by Airbnb’s monitoring procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Airbnb’s current measures to ensure trust and safety for hosts are not enough to protect 
hosts from issues involving the legality of their Airbnb rental because these measures disclaim 
Airbnb from liability for users’ actions and do not ensure that rentals comply with state and local 
housing regulations.
247
 Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Airbnb is not liable 
for the actions of its hosts because the Act protects interactive computer service providers from 
liability to promote the growth of the Internet.
248
 Because Airbnb is not liable for its hosts’ 
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violations of housing laws, state and local governments target the hosts to enforce the legality of 
Airbnb units.
249
 Although different alternatives exist to shift the burden of ensuring the legality 
of Airbnb units from hosts to the platform, the most promising option is to apply social pressure 
to Airbnb until it adopts screening procedures that monitor and ensure compliance with the state 
and local regulations for each listing.
250
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